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Abstract: This paper examines the existence of financial statement
manipulation in the U.S. during a time period when many of the cur-
rent motivations did not exist. The study looks for types of manipula-
tions that would be motivated by the pre-SEC operating environment.
To examine this issue, a sample of U.S. firms from the 1915 Moody's
Analyses of Investments is divided into industrial firms, railroads, and
utilities. The railroad and utility companies faced rate regulatiori dur-
ing this time period, providing incentives to manipulate the financial
reports so as to maximize the rate received. Industrial firms were not
regulated. These companies wanted to attract investors, motivating
manipulations to increase income and net assets. To determine if
manipulations are occurring, a Benford's Law analysis is used. This
analysis examines the frequency of numbers in certain positions
within an amount to determine if the distribution of the numbers is
similar to the pattern documented by Benford's Law. Some manipula-
tions consistent with expectations are found.
Companies face incentives to choose accounting policies
and estimates to achieve certain goals. Managers may want to
smooth earnings, maximize earnings, or meet analysts' earnings
forecasts. They may want to generate enough earnings to be
able to issue dividends or to maintain their current or debt ra-
tios to satisfy lending agreements. Earnings management is the
process of choosing accounting alternatives to achieve desired
accounting results. McKee [2005] stresses that earnings man-
agement uses legal methods as opposed to fraud. Managers may
also engage in economic earnings management by making oper-
ating decisions designed to achieve desired accounting results.
Several authors have examined accounting policy choice to
study earnings management. Many studies have focused on the
choice of inventory cost-flow assumption [Morse and Richard-
son, 1983; Hunt, 1985; Johnson and Dhaliwal, 1988; Lindahl,
1989]. In general, these studies have found that companies
choose the LIFO inventory cost-flow assumption if they face
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high inflation in the cost of inputs, and also if they have certain
accounting characteristics such as a high current ratio, low debt
ratio, and/or large amounts of unrestricted retained earnings.
These characteristics allow firms to continue with contracts that
rely on accounting measures while using LIFO to reduce taxable
income.
Other studies have modeled the accrual process and used
the results to estimate abnormal accruals. These studies have
then used abnormal accruals to examine a number of issues
related to earnings management [Rees et al., 1996; Cheng and
Warfield, 2005; Peasnell et al., 2005; Morsfield and Tan, 2006;
Pincus et al, 2007]
Another approach to examine earnings management is Ben-
ford's Law. Digits are not uniformly distributed in naturally oc-
curring, unrestricted data. Instead, the first digit is much more
likely to be small and much less likely to be large. For example,
approximately 30% of the first digits will be one. This is thought
to be due to the geometric growth of natural processes [Nigrini,
1999]. Manipulated data do not tend to follow Benford's Law.
This occurs because people may overuse a favorite number, for
example, or may tend to overuse large digits or the digit one
in an attempt to overstate results. Benford's Law can then be
used to detect fraud (Nigrini and Mittermaier, 1997; Carr, 2005;
Cleary and Thibodeau, 2005; Johnson, 2005] or earnings man-
agement [Skousen et ai, 2004; Guan et al., 2006, 2008; Jordan
and Clark, 2011].
This study will examine the earnings management of U.S.
company-reported data from the 1915 Moody's Analyses of In-
vestments {Moody's) using a Benford's Law analysis. This time
period is being chosen because it is before the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) was created so that U.S. govern-
ment regulation of securities did not exist. This time period is
also before the existence of promulgated U.S. generally accepted
accounting principles (GAAP) and modem auditing techniques.
The study will examine what types of manipulation occurred
in this environment and whether the manipulations are con-
sistent with basic incentives to maximize the value of the firm.
The analysis used is empirical which will extend the existing
historical literature that is primarily based on conjecture and
conventional wisdom. The sample of firms will be broken into
industrial companies, which faced no U.S. federal governmental
regulation, and railroads and utilities, which did have govern-
ment-imposed rate regulations. By looking at these two groups
of firms, the role of non-securities regulation can be examined
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as a deterrent to financial statement manipulation.
Examining these issues will help the profession better
understand the important role that securities' regulation does
play in providing higher quality financial statements. It will also
provide insight regarding the role of other forms of oversight
of accounting practice and disclosures in improving reporting.
Rate regulators in the railroad and utility industries are shown
to provide some effective controls over certain types of financial
statement manipulation, while the regulatory process seems to
encourage other types of manipulations. Specifically, unregulat-
ed industrial companies primarily managed gross revenue, total
net income, and payables. Regulated companies also managed
payables. In addition, the regulated companies managed other
income in the income statement and property, plant, and equip-
ment, equity, and bonds payable in the balance sheet. These
differential results between the groups studied indicate that pre-
SEC regulatory actions did influence accounting choices.
The general conclusion that rate regulation did deter ma-
nipulation of operating revenues and operating income also has
current ramifications. There are movements within the profes-
sion to increase oversight of reporting. The results presented
here indicate that increased scrutiny of financial statements
will lead to less manipulation in those areas under scrutiny,
but can also encourage manipulation in areas not under scru-
tiny. Overall, this study contributes to our understanding of the
importance of both securities-based and non-securities-based
regulation on financial reporting and management incentives to
manipulate those reports to achieve reporting goals or personal
gain.
The next sections provide a discussion of the background
for the study, a review of the literature, and development of
hypotheses. These sections are followed by a discussion of the
methodology. The results of the Benford's Law tests are then
presented. The last section presents a discussion and conclusion.
BACKGROUND
Prior to the establishment of the SEC, financial reporting
was not federally regulated in the U.S. While U.S. stock ex-
changes typically required financial statements for listed com-
panies, GAAP were not well developed, and unlisted firms could
trade on the exchanges as long as they provided a balance sheet
[Sivakumar and Waymire, 1993]. The first published attempt at
U.S. accounting standardization was "Uniform Accounts." is-
sued April 1, 1917, in the Federal Reserve Bulletin [Tucker, 1987].
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FuU financial statement audits were not required for New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE) listed companies until 1933 [Skinner,
1987]. Listing requirements, however, only applied to newly
listed companies. As a result, 85% of listed companies had a
full audit in 1933 [Gross, 2002]. The NYSE did have a hsting
requirement of a balance-sheet audit starting in 1910 [Sivaku-
mar and Waymire, 1993]. Prior to 1917, the lack of promulgated
accounting standards and minimal audit requirements created
a situation that allowed firms to choose accounting policies to
achieve desired results with fewer limitations than fiirms face
today.
This study will use this time period, then, to examine
whether managers took advantage of the lack of regulation and
standardization to manipulate the reported financial informa-
tion. To complete this investigation, the types of manipulations
to look for need to be considered. This consideration needs to
take into account the time period under study as the current
types of manipulations seen in recent studies may not have been
common in 1915 because, for instance, managers may not have
had incentive contracts. Therefore, literature will be examined
that is of both an historical nature and more current to consider
what types of accounts may have been manipulated and the ra-
tionale for that manipulation.
The literature that is of an histodcal nature is used to give
perspective on the way financial information was prepared and
used. This provides insights on what types of accounts would
most likely be manipulated. In reviewing the literature, the
majodty of papers with much depth regarding the preparation
and use of financial information in the early 1900s are focused
on the U.K. The literature on U.S. firms from this time pedod is
both less substantial and less detailed. Therefore, the literature
discussed in the next section will be for both U.S. and U.K.-
based studies. While companies in these two countries did oper-
ate in different economic and regulatory environments, there
were many similarities as well. Consideration of both reporting
environments can provide indicators of the types of accounts
that managers of the day may have manipulated.
LITERATURE
Accounting and Reporting in the U.K.: Laws in the U.K. estab-
lished reporting and auditing requirements pdor to the time
pedod of this study. The Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844
required audited balance sheets [Morris, 1993]. This was the
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earliest legislation requiring financial disclosure. Edwards
[1992] notes that balance-sheet audits were mandatory by
1900. Legislation also standardized the reporting formats for
railroads in 1868, gas utilities in 1871, and electric utilities in
1882. Therefore, there was considerably more observation and
standardization of U.K. company reporting than U.S. reports
at the same time. This increased audit oversight and reporting
requirements may have led to less manipulation. Arnold [1998]
does indicate that legislation prior to 1948 was inadequate for
providing satisfactory disclosures and a reporting environment
useful for those making capital-investment decisions. Thus,
the reporting environment in the early 1900s, while more regu-
lated than the U.S. at the same time, still leant itself to potential
manipulation and reporting norms that would be more closely
scrutinized under today's standards. The issues of interest in
this, literature are examples of how accounting and reporting
were used to manage earnings and to provide insights into the
types of accounts or statements where manipulation would most
likely be found. These studies are non-empirical in nature, but
they do provide useful insights regarding the belief of informed
historians regarding where and why manipulations of financial
reporting occurred.
Secret reserves were common in the U.K. These reserves
were used to overstate financial position and to smooth earn-
ings [Edwards, 1976; Arnold, 1991]. Companies often created
reserves by overstating liabilities or depreciation during years of
high income and then liquidating the reserves during lean years
[Amold, 1991].
Arnold [1998] examined intemal information versus pub-
lished statements for 30 U.K. companies between 1900 and
1924. His results indicate that prior to 1914, little manipulation
of the statements occurred. From 1915-1924, his analysis docu-
mented manipulations of reported versus internal numbers.
This manipulation was achieved through depreciation, taxation,
and secret reserves, used by 25% of the companies after 1915.
As a result of the lack of audits and promulgated account-
ing standards, manipulation and omission were common in
public financial statements in the U.K. Maltby [1998] noted that
concerns over fraud and measurement uncertainty led to the
Joint Stock Company legislation in Britain in the late 1800s.
Lee [1975] indicated that the act of 1856 limited dividends paid
to shareholders to reported earnings. This legislation also re-
quired annual balance sheets and statements of income. Bryer
[1993] described the more widely owned corporations result-
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ing from the merger wave at the turn of the 20th century in
Britain as manager-controlled firms. In these entities, investors
were seen as no more than loose constraints on management
action. The accounting model that was developed at the. time
was easy for management to manipulate. Lee [1975] indicated
that it was managers' opinion that shareholders only needed to
know income so that they would be aware of the dividend to
expect. Thus, income was manipulated through the use of secret
reserves to allow for more conservative dividend payments to
owners. Jones and Aiken [1994] also support the assertion that
most of the income manipulation was used to stabilize dividend
policy. The problem for investors in the early 20th century in the
U.K. was not lack of disclosure as much as manipulation of and
omissions in the statements provided. Without any reporting
standards or regulations, what and how much to report was at
the discretion of the Board of Directors.
Accounting and Reporting in the U.S.: Manipulation by Ameri-
can companies prior to the establishment of the SEC has been
more infrequently studied than in the U.K. Merino and Neimark
[1982] claimed, however, that financial statements were of poor
quality and unreliable. Hawkins [1963] noted that during the
1920s, the Investment Bankers Association of America sought
greater standardization of accounting information provided by
industrial issuers. Statements were difficult to use for analysis
because of a lack of standardization.
Johnson [1943] examined reporting of U.S. companies and
found large charges and credits being made directly to surplus
or reserves that should have been included in income, using a
modern view of an all-inclusive income statement. Some charg-
es were so large that they exceeded the reported income of the
entity. Without standards to guide practice, what amounts went
through reported income and what types of charges and credits
went directly to surplus was at the discretion of management
and the Board of Directors. For instance. Kern [2000] provided
evidence that depreciation varied between good and poor years
for companies between 1908 and 1930. This was an area of re-
porting that could easily be manipulated in an attempt to make
the company look like a better investment prospect. Johnson
[1943] noted that operating results generally did go through
income, but nonoperating activity was inconsistently allocated
between income and surplus.
Merino (1993) discussed the use of reserves to limit distrib-
utable income since it was common to pay all income as divi-
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dends prior to 1920. These reserves were then used to regulate
the amount of dividend payments and resulted in reported in-
come manipulation to achieve the desired dividend distribution
to shareholders. Thus, the condition of reporting in the U.S. was
similar to that described by Bryer [1993] in Britain. Managers
and the Board of Directors were free to adjust discretionary
amounts such as depreciation, depletion, and reserves to report
the income they wanted to report.
Rate Regulation in the U.S.: Public concern over rates in the
late 1800s led to the regulation of railroads and utilities. The
first laws were the Granger Laws established in the Midwestern
states in the 1870s. These laws gave states the ability to regulate
railroad rates [Ulen, 1980].
Rate regulation was typically based on cost plus a fair
return on investment [Covaleski, et al., 1995]. This provided
regulated companies, such as railroads and utilities, an incen-
tive to over-invest in assets in order to maximize the rate and,
therefore, revenue. Boockholdt [1978] noted that the use of
these return-on-invested-capital (ROIC) rate-setting regula-
tions coincides in time with the increased use of the retirement
method of depreciation and a trend toward capitalizing rather
than expensing new assets. While he did not empirically test this
relationship, the correlation between a regulatory change and
a change in accounting policies seems to have clearly existed.
These changes in accounting policies were such that it would
tend to increase rates. These may not have been the only types
of accounting changés made in response to rate regulation. This
study seeks to determine if other efforts may also have been
used by these regulated companies to manipulate the rate base.
Alternatively, the regulation process may have provided
some scrutiny of the accounting process, reducing the ability of
the managers to manipulate assets [Baskin, 1988; McKee, 2005].
The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) was established
in 1887. The ICC devised an accounting system that served
as a basis for examining revenues, expenses, and earnings of
railroads and utilities so that fair rates could be established
[Trebing, 1984]. These examinations may have acted to limit
regulated companies' abilities to manipulate income. An ex-
ample of such a limit would relate to property, plant, and equip-
ment. If physical comparisons were made to accounting records,
companies could no longer capitalize assets that were complete-
ly utilized in the current period since they would not be physi-
cally present to examine. Adequacy of depreciation would be an-
152 Accounting Historians Joumal, December 2011
Other possible item for regulators to examine through these laws
thai: could have been highly manipulated without the regulatory
oversight. As a result of these regulatory movements, account-
ing-rate-of-retum-based laws existed in 29 states and the federal
govemment by 1913 [Trebing, 1984]. The Hepbum Act (1906)
empowered the ICC to establish a uniform chart of accounts for
railroads [Ulen, 1980]. This uniformity in reporting would fur-
ther reduce management's ability to manipulate earnings. Siva-
kumar and Waymire [2003] provide some empirical support for
this lack of manipulation, reporting that railroads responded to
accounting rules for fixed assets by adopting more conservative
accounting policies to reduce earnings and, thereby, preventing
lower rates rather than engaging in income-smoothing activities
by adjusting maintenance expenses to counteract high or low
revenue periods.
HYPOTHESES
The literature examined in the previous section seems to
indicate that companies had the ability and incentive to ma-
nipulate income during the early 1900s. Incentives to manage
earnings during that time period differ from incentives today.
For example, fewer analysts followed firms in the early 20th cen-
tury so the need to meet analysts' earnings forecasts may have
either not existed or been much less significant. However, since
individual investors still had expectations, incentives existed
to maximize or smooth earnings. The literature also indicates
that incentives existed to manage earnings to satisfy dividend
requirements or to remain attractive to lenders [Lee, 1975; Meri-
no, 1993]. To help individual investors make decisions, Moody's
issued stock and bond ratings. These ratings, in turn, were
influenced by financial results. Thus, attracting investors would
have been easier with higher net assets and income. The litera-
ture indicated that reserves were commonly used to accomplish
this goal [Johnson, 1943; Edwards, 1976; Arnold, 1991; Merino,
1993]. This implies that the basic motive to improve the appear-
ance of the company through "window dressing" existed in the
pre-SEC environment as it does today.
Incentives to reduce income also existed. In 1909, the gov-
emment passed an excise tax on corporate income of 1% of in-
come in excess of $5,000 [Previts and Bricker, 1994]. Thus, there
were competing pressures on income manipulation to achieve
different goals.
Audits were less frequent and less developed than today.
Balance-sheet-only audits were a common practice, becoming
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popular around 1910 [Gilman, 1939; Corcell, 1989]. Baskin
[1988] noted that the lax standards of the day relegated account-
ing earnings to be a validation of dividend policy. The reporting
environment was such that not all firms issued financial state-
ments, and the statements issued vaded greatly in the level of
quality and quantity of detail provided [Brief, 1987]. A lack of
standardized GAAP and less detailed audits created a situation
where managers were able to make a greater number of ac-
counting choices than today.
HI: Unregulated companies managed earnings and net as-
sets to appear to be a more favorable investment.
However, as a result of rate regulation, railroads and utili-
ties may have been less able to manipulate operating costs and
earnings than unregulated companies. The regulated companies
had an incentive not to appear too profitable in order to avoid
rate reduction and/or increased regulation. Thus, the incen-
tive in income manipulation may have been to reduce income
through higher non-operating costs and deferdng other income
rather than increasing income as would be the case for most
unregulated companies. Likewise, the increasing of reserves to
hide excessive profit may also have been used. The regulated
companies were receiving enough scrutiny; they did not want to
attract more through the appearance of high profit margins.
Regulated companies had an incentive to manage assets to
charge higher rates, but the regulatory environment left them
unable to manipulate operating revenues. In this sense, regula-
tors may have been providing an audit function with respect to
some of the reported information of these regulated entities in
the absence of actual financial statement audits.
H2: Rate-regulated companies managed net assets to in-
crease the numbers to provide higher rates and only
nonoperating components of eamings through income
decreasing manipulations.
METHODOLOGY
This study examines eamings management among firms
listed in the 1915 Moody's Analyses of Investments. This publica-
tion included data for 5,334 companies. A random sample of
810 companies was taken. Companies were eliminated if they
were wholly owned subsidiaries (331), were incorporated out-
side the U.S. (10), were in receivership (1), or had no financial
statements (141). This left a sample of 129 industrial companies
(123 of which published an income statement and 128 of which
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published a balance sheet), 89 railroads (82 of which pubhshed
an income statement and 72 of which published a balance
sheet), and 109 utilities (105 of which published an income
statement and. 92 of which published a balance sheet).
Earnings management may be operationalized in a variety
of ways. Specific accounting policies are not disclosed in the
1915 Moody's. The average number of line items disclosed in
the income statement was 4.33. With this lack of detail in the
financial statements, estimating accruals would be too difficult.
Therefore, earnings management is measured by whether the
distribution of first digits in numbers conforms to Benford's
Law.
Digits are not uniformly distributed in naturally occurring,
unrestricted data. Instead, the first digit is much more likely
to be small and correspondingly less likely to be large. This is
thought to be due to the geometric growth of natural processes.
Benford postulated that first digits in naturally distributed
data are distributed with probability equal to log(l + l/d), where
d represents the digit and log is the base 10 logarithm [Nigrini
and Mittermaier, 1997]. The following chart provides the prob-
ability that the first digit of any number has the yalue given:
igit
1 •
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Probabilitv
0.30103
0.17609
0.12494
0.09691
0.07918
0.06695
0.05799
0.05115
0.04576
Manipulated data do not tend to follow Benford's Law. This
occurs because people may overuse a favorite number, for ex-
ample, or may tend to overuse large digits or the digit one in an
attempt to overstate results. Benford's Law can be used to detect
fraud [Nigrini and Mittermaier, 1977; Cleary and Thibadeau,
2005; Carr, 2005; Johnson, 2005; Kelly, 2011] or earnings man-
agement.
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Guan, et al. [2006] used Benfoird's Law to find that U.S.
firms engage in cosmetic earnings management to achieve key
reference points in each of the reported four quarters. The
fourth quarter, which is audited, has less manipulation. Jordan
and Clark [2011] reported that cosmetic earnings management
decreased afrer passage of Sarbanes-Oxley. Skousen et al. [2004]
and Guan et al. [2008] reported similar cosmetic rounding of
reported earnings among Japanese and Taiwanese firms, respec-
tively.
Lin et al. [2011] used Benford's Law to show that Taiwanese
firms tend to report earnings in increments of 5 or 10. Zhou
[2010] reported that using I/B/E/S, analyst forecasts that are in
increments of 5 tend to be more optimistic and be accompanied
by weaker stock-market responses.
Benford's Law analysis only utilizes information from one
account unlike accounting policy choice or abnormal accrual
estimation techniques which utilize information from other
accounting choices or reported amounts. This focus on one
account results in Benford's Law studies having less statistical
power to detect earnings management. Only manipulations of
one account significant enough and frequent enough to alter the
distribution of digits can be detected. The other techniques can
combine the changes in various accounts to detect manipulation
rather than rely on adjustment to one account alone. However,
Benford's Law can be tested on any set of data without the need
to gather other information that may be difficult or impossible
to identify, especially during the early 20th century when ac-
counting was not as fully developed as it is today and when dis-
closure was less complete.
The actual distribution of first digits will be compared to
the expected distribution with the goodness-of-fit test. The chi-
square statistic was computed for the overall distribution. A sec-
ond statistic was computed to measure firms' potential desire to
manage size. Firms wanting to make an amount appear'larger
want to manage first digits up to the next 1 or 5. Firms wanting
to make an amount to appear smaller would want to manage
the first digit down to the previous 9 or 4 [Carslaw, 1988; Skou-
sen et ah; Guan and Wetzel, 2004]. The second chi-square sta-
tistic compared the distribution of three sets of first digits: 1 or
5 (for line-item amount increases), 4 or 9 (for line item-amount
decreases), and all other digits. In addition, the t-statistic was
used to test the distribution of the digits 1, 4, 5, and 9 relative to
Benford's Law.
Each line item in the reported financial statements was
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gathered. Because of the lack of standards during this time pe-
riod, there was considerable variation in the account titles given
in Moody's. The authors combined only obviously similar items
(such as cost of goods sold and cost of sales). If there was any
doubt that a title represented something different than the titles
already in use, the line item was added to the data base as a
separately titled account. As a result, the data base used had 107
balance-sheet account titles and 48 income-statement account
titles. The goodness-of-fit tests were conducted for each account
title that had 20 or more observations in the sample. By examin-
ing items as reported, the Benford's Law test is being used ap-
propriately by examining naturally occurring numbers. If line
items were arbitrarily combined, the numbers being reported
would no longer be naturally occurring numbers, and therefore,
Benford's Law would not apply. The tests were separately con-
ducted for unregulated industrial companies and rate-regulated
companies.
RESULTS
Unregulated Companies: Table 1 presents the results of the
goodness-of-fit test for the income statements of unregulated
industrial companies. These companies were tested for gross
revenue, gross eamings, operating expenses, depreciation, pre-
ferred dividends, dividends paid, fixed charges, total net income,
balance, and final surplus. The overall goodness-of-fit test for
total net income was significant with a probability 0.079. Gross
revenue had a first digit of 1 or 5 more frequently than expected,
though the frequency of the digit 5 did not achieve significance
when considered individually. This result indicates that in-
dustrial companies had a tendency to report revenue in larger
amounts than Benford's Law would expect. Interestingly, 17 of
the 32 companies reporting net income had a first digit of 1,
while none of the companies reported a first digit of 5. The chi-
square test for the combined first digits is not significant. Still,
the evidence suggests a tendency to report total net income that
appears larger, moving into the next digit with a leading one.
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TABLE 1
Goodness-of-Fit Tests
Unregulated Industrial Companies Income Statements
Statement Line
Item
Gross Revenue
Gross Earnings
Operating
Expenses
Depreciation
Preferred
Dividends
Dividends Paid
Fixed Charges
Total Net
Income
Balance
Final Surplus
N
46
24
32
35
23
49
26
32
50
82
Distribu-
tion of 1"
digit
Chi-square
Probability
0.271
0.352
0.404
0.305
0.422
0.191
0.832
0.079*
0.616
0.634
t-statistic
1
1.82**
0.57
0.72
-0.72
-0.19
-0.08
2.65***
0.14
-0.53
5
I.Ol
-0.30
-0.02
-0.80
-1.02
0.32
-1.33*
4
-0.48
0.12
-0.96
0.63
-1.09
-0.36
-1.12
0.58
9
-0.82
-0.89
-1.19
-0.65
0.88
0.14
-0.13
Distribution
of 1 & 5, 4 &
9, and others
Chi-square
Probability
0.035**
0.833
0.196
0.968
0.423
0.085*
0.872
0.151
0.689
0.756
* 10% Significance ** 5% Significance *** 1% Significance
T-statistics are adjusted for the finite correction factor. Raw statistics less than
0.50 are omitted from the table.
The only other line item disclosed in the income state-
ment to have a significant deviation from Benford's Law was
dividends paid. The digits 4 and 9 were less likely than expected
even though neither digit achieved significance individually.
Reporting these digits less frequently than expected indicates a
tendency to pay larger dividends than would be expected from a
normal distribution of first digits even though the frequency of
the digits 1 and 5 do not statistically indicate the tendency for
larger dividend payments. This finding of inflated dividend pay-
ments is consistent with Lee [1975] who noted that the dividend
policy of companies during this time period was to maximize
the dividend paid to shareholders.
Table 2 presents the results of the goodness-of-fit tests for
the balance sheets of unregulated industrial companies. The
balance-sheet items tested were property, plant, and equipment;
investments; inventories; bills receivable; accounts receivable;
cash; common stock; preferred stock; bonded debt; bills pay-
able; accounts payable; reserve; surplus; and total assets.
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TABLE 2
Goodness-of-Fit Tests
Unregulated Industrial Company Balance Sheets
Statement
Line Item
Property,
Plant, and
Eipuipment
Investments
Inventories
Bills
Receivable
Accounts
Receivable
Cash
Common
Stock
Preferred
Stock
Bonded Debt
Bills Payable
Accounts
Payable
Reserves
.Surplus
Total Assets
N
79
28
38
30
64
93
100
48
39
30
58
34
90
104
Distribu-
tion of P'
digit
Chi-square
Probability
0.904
0.736
0.717
0.567
0.423
0.423
0.105
0.017**
0.426
0.634
0.057*
0.561
0.406
0.010**
t-statistic
1
-0.80
-0.38
0.35
0.58
-1.84**
-0.79
-2.31**
-0.30
-1.13
-1.41*
-1.42*
0.47
-0.14
-0.17
5
-0.31
0.08
0.25
1.20
2.44***
0.76
-0.53
1.15
-1.03
-0.99
4
0.70
1.54*
-0.25
0.54
1.57*
0.61
0.41
0.93
-0.25
2.17**
-1.04
-0.19
9
-0.60
0.20
0.11
-0.85
0.62
-0.51
-1.17
0.11
1.79**
-0.05
-0.82
0.82
Distribu-
tion of 1
&5,4&9,
and others
Chi-square
Probability
0.644
0.764
0.190
0.612
0.342
0.114
0.708
0.826
0.340
0.597
0.003***
0.218
0.441
0.656
* 10% Significance
T-statistics are adjusted for the
0.50 are omitted from the table.
5% Significance *** 1% Significance
finite correction factor Raw statistics less than
Unregulated industrial companies had a tendency to under-
stale accounts payable. This is indicated by the significance of
both the first digit distribution as a whole and the distribution
of ], 4 and 9, and other numbers relative to 1 and 5 and 4 and 9.
The direction of the distribution is determined by the t-statistics
of each number. These t-statistics show that the digits 4 and 9
were both significantly more common, and the number 1 was
less common than expected by Benford's Law. One was also less
common for bills payable. However, the other results from ac-
counts payable were not replicated for bills payable.
Some evidence of eamings management behavior is demon-
strated among current-asset accounts. Both the inventory and cash
accounts show the number 4 being the first digit more often than
expected. For accounts receivable, 1 is a first digit less often than
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expected. Surprisingly, in each case, the company manipulated the
reported balance to make the account appear smaller than a distri-
bution of numbers consistent with Benford's Law would look.
The equity accounts also had deviations from the distri-
bution of first digit numbers that would be expected under
Benford's Law. In the common-stock account, 1 is less com-
mon and 5 is more common than expected. These results are
opposite each other since the frequency of both 1 and 5 indicate
an increasing manipulation effect [Carslaw,1988; Skousen et at.,
2004]. Both the chi-square statistic for the first digit as a whole
and for the groupings of 1 and 5, 4 and 9, and all other numbers
are insignificant for common stock. Thus, the intent of the ma-
nipulation with common stock is unclear.
The overall distribution of first digits is significantly differ-
ent from expected for the preferred-stock account. However,
the other reported statistics do not show a significant deviation
from the expected distribution. The only digits that showed sig-
nificance were 2 (t-statistic of 3.42) and 6 (t-statistic of 1.57).
Total assets also show a similar result. The overall distribu-
tion of first digits significantly differs from Benford's Law as
shown by the significance of the overall chi-square result. How-
ever, the only other significant differences from the expected
distribution were for 2 (t-statistic of 2.01), 6 (t-statistic of 2.17),
and 8 (t-statistic of 2.75). These numbers were all more common
than expected and do not represent increasing or decreasing
tendencies. A total would also be difficult to manipulate since it
is the sum of previous numbers. Therefore, the significant result
found here is probably not related to manipulation.
Regutated Companies: Table 3 presents the results of the
goodness-of-fit tests for the income statement of regulated
companies. The income statement line items tested for these
companies were gross revenue, operating expenses, tax accrued,
depreciation, other income, preferred dividends, dividends paid,
fixed charges, total net income, balance, and final surplus. The
lack of significance in the overall goodness-of-fit test for net
income indicates that the distribution of first digits is consistent
with Benford's Law. This suggests that the regulatory process
provided enough scrutiny over reporiing to discourage earnings
management of net income. Significant deviations were found,
however, in components of the income statement. The first digit
of tax accrued was less likely to be 1 and more likely to be 9
than expected. This result indicates a tendency to understate
this expense even though neither the chi-square statistic for the
distribution of first digits as a whole nor the chi-square tests
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considering 1 and 5, 4 and 9, and all other numbers were signifi-
cant. This manipulation of taxes is consistent .with the findings
of Arnold [1998], who reported that taxation was one of three
reported numbers that differed from internal data in his analysis
of U.K. companies during a similar time period.
TABLE 3
Goodness-of-Fit Tests
Regulated Company Income Statements
Statement
Line Item
Gross
Revenues
Operating
Expenses
Tax Accrued
Depreciation
Otiher Income
Preferred
Dividends
Dividends Paid
Fixed Charges
Total Net
Income
Balance
Final Surplus
N
158
165
36
29
53
25
71
116
44
59
137
Distribu-
tion of P'
digit
Chi-square
Probability
0.671
0.747
0.438
0.747
0.059*
0.123
0.195
0.959
0.234
0.291
0.114
t-statistic
1
-0.70
0.82
-1.58*
0.46
-0.57
-0.36
-0.70
5
-0.59
-0.16
0.40
0.83
-1.88**
1.13
-0.93
-0.24
0.01
-0.56
0.21
4
0.92
-0.19
2.03**
0.52
-0.96
-0.86
0.78
-1.96**
9
-0.66
-0.39
1.48*
0.15
1.36*
0.14
-1.09
-0.12
0.50
Distribution
of 1 & 5,
4 & 9, and
others
Chi-square
Probability
0.309
0.571
0.394
0.740
0.089*
0.490
0.460
0.554
0.413
0.624
0.235
* 10% Significance ** 5% Significance *** 1% Significance
T-statistics are adjusted for the finite correction factor. Raw statistics less than
0.5C' are omitted from the table.
Other income tended to be understated as indicated by the
digits 4 and 9 being more common and 5 less common than ex-
pected. Both the chi-square statistic for the first digit as a whole
and the chi-square statistic for frequency of 1 and 5, 4 and. 9,
and other digits were significant. These chi-square results show
that reported other income fails to follow the pattern of first
di^ts expected from Benford's Law. Combined with the t-test
result for the numbers 1 (being too few) and 9 (being too fre-
quent), the conclusion can be drawn that regulated companies
attempted to minimize the affect of other income on total net in-
come. This is consistent with attempting to appear not any more
profitable than necessary to avoid rate reduction.
The only other significant result in the income statement of reg-
ulated companies was that the digit 4 in final surplus was less com-
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mon than expected. This indicates that regulated companies made
some attempt to make retained income appear larger.,However, the
test for increased frequency of the number 5 was not significant.
Table 4 presents the results of goodness-of-fit tests for the
balance sheets of regulated companies. The account balances
tested for these companies were property, plant, and equipment;
investments; bills receivable; accounts receivable; supplies and
materials; cash; common stock; preferred stock; bonded debt;
notes payable; accrued liabilities; bills payable; accounts pay-
able; current liabilities; reserves; surplus; and total assets.
TABLE 4
Goodness-of-Fit Tests
Regulated Company Balance Sheets
Statement
Line Item
Property,
Plant, and
Equipment
Investments
Bills
Receivable
Accounts
Receivable
Supplies and
Materials
Cash
Common
Stock
Preferred
Stock
Bonded Debt
Notes Payable
Accrued
Liabilities
Bills Payable
Accounts Pay-
able
Current Li-
abilities
Reserves
Surplus
Total Assets
N
82
30
33
48
64
92
97
48
79
27
27
28
32
30
45
76
103
Distribu-
tion of P'
digit
Chi-square
Probability
0.348 •
0.281
0.207
0.864
0.330
0.809
0.014**
0.106
0.071*
0.209
0.360
0.507
0.783
0.120
0.272
0.300
0.069*
t-statistic
1
-1.97**
-0.61
-0.54
1.27
0.88
0.64
0.51
1.59*
-0.80
-0.26
1.00
0.021
-1.96**
1.16
-2.04**
5
-0.59
0.66
-0.30
2.56***
-0.25
-0.31
-0.45
-1.17
0.20
-1.07
0.13
4
1.33**
0.37
-0.41
-0.29
-0.72
0.56
-1.00
-2.03**
1.08
-0.08
-0.08
1.78**
0.84
-0.25
0.57
1.60*
1.84**
9
0.92
0.11
-0.48
-0.35
-1.43*
0.90
1.55*
-0.68
0.20
0.03
-0.76
0.31
-0.54
2.26**
Distribution
of 1 & 5, 4 &
9, and others
Chi-square
Probability
0,043**
0.385
0.733
0.275
0.329
0.833
0.041**
0.370
0.085*
0.258
0.886
0.066*
0.358
0.311
0.150
0.399
0.004***
* 10% Significance **
T-statistics are adjusted for the
0.50 are omitted from the table.
5% Significance *** 1% Significance
finite correction factor. Raw statistics less than
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Similar to unregulated companies, the digit 4 was more
common than expected in bills payable. This result was also
found in the chi-square statistic for the digits 4 and 9. The digit
9 v/as also more common than expected in bonded debt. Both
the chi-square for the entire first digit and the chi-square for
the 1 and 5, 4 and 9, and all other digits were significant as well.
Taken together, these results indicate that regulated companies
had a tendency to report bills payable and bonded debt as smafl-
er amounts than would be expected within Benford's Law.
For property, plant, and equipment, the digit 1 was less
common and the digit 4 more common than would be expected
given Benford's Law. The common occurrence of these digits in-
dicates a tendency to reduce the size of the property, plant, and
equipment account balance shown. This result is also confirmed
in the chi-square statistic for the combined distribution of 1 and
5 and 4 and 9, which is also significant. This balance-reducing
behavior may seem opposite the incentive provided by regulated
rates which would seem to encourage overinvestment in assets.
This result is also opposite the expected result of changes in ac-
counting policy noted by Bookholdt [1978]. However, companies
may have been manipulating downward to reduce scrutiny by
the regulators and appear more efficient by using fewer assets to
generate the revenue that they actually generated.
The equity accounts show clearer evidence of numeric
manipulation than in the case of the unregulated companies.
In common stock, 5 was more common and 9 less common
than expected. Both the chi-square for the first digit as a whole
and the chi-square for the combined distribution of 1 and 5, 4
and 9, and all other numbers were significant. These results all
consistently point to a tendency to report larger common stock
balances than would be expected. For preferred stock, 1 was
more common and 4 less common than the expected Benford's
Law distribution. However, for the preferred stock, neither the
chi-square for the first digit distribution nor the distribution
for 1 and 5, 4 and 9, and all other numbers was significant. The
individual number results again point to balance-increasing
manipulations. These results indicate that regulated compa-
nies were consistently inflating the capital-stock balances on
their balance sheets. For any given amount of income, higher
equity balances would result in lower retum on equity. This
result could have given regulated companies some leverage for
obtaining higher rates to ensure a better return for their capital
providers. By decreasing bonded debt, which was shown in
this table as well, the portion of financing provided by equity
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providers* is also maximized. Thus, the managers could inform
regulators that if adequate return is not given to their sharehold-
ers that the regulated entities will be unable to attract additional
capital and grow. The companies may have chosen equity as the
place to manipulate because it was scrutinized to a lesser extent
than either income or fixed assets. The ICC examined revenues,
expenses, and earnings [Trebing, 1984] and physical assets are
clearly visible. However, the balances of capital stock were not
considered in the legislation or policies for rate regulation and
would be more difficult for regulators to monitor. Merino [1993]
points out that watered stock was common in the early 20th
century. The increasing account-balance manipulations detected
in this study seem to give empirical weight to this contention.
Reserves showed a lower than expected number for the digit
1, but this was the only significant result for reserves. The digit 4
was more common than expected for the surplus balance. Both
of these results again indicate a reducing effect on total equity.
Total assets have significantly fewer first digits as number
1 and significantly more first digits 4 and 9 than would be ex-
pected under Benford's Law. For total assets, both the chi-square
for the distribution of first digits and the chi-square for the
distdbution of 1 and 5, 4 and 9, and all other digits were signifi-
cant. Thus, total assets appear to be manipulated in a downward
direction. This is inconsistent with the hypothesis that rate-
regulated entities would increase their asset base to raise rates.
However, regulatory scrutiny and pressure may have actually
encouraged the companies to reduce these numbers.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Table 5 summarizes the results described in the previous
section along with indicating the hypothesized manipulation.
A line item was considered for inclusion in this summary table
when there were two significant results in a consistent direc-
tion in the previous tables. Section A of Table 5 considers the
unregulated industrial companies. The results found were highly
consistent with the hypothesis that these companies would ma-
nipulate income and net assets to appear to be a better invest-
ment prospect. The results indicate that companies tended to
increase gross revenues leading to increased total net income.
Moody's [1915] and other investment services did provide invest-
ment ratings for companies, and these ratings related to income.
Therefore, manipulating income in an upward direction would
result in a better investment rating and the ability to attract in-
creased capital at a lower cost. The income-statement manipu-
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lations found were then consistent with company incentives.
Likewise on the balance sheet, a safer company is one with
higher net assets. The results again supported this hypothesis
with significant decreases in accounts payable observed.
TABLES
Summary of Results
Section A
Unregulated
Companies
Income Statement
Revenues
Expenses
Totals
Balance Sheet
Assets
Liabilities
Equity
Section B
Regulated
Companies
Income Statement
Opsrating Revenues
Nonoperating
Revenues
Operating Expenses
Nonoperating
Expenses
Totals
3alance Sheet
Assets
Liabilities
Equity
Hypotheses
Increasing
Decreasing
Increasing
Increasing
Decreasing
Increasing
NA
Decreasing
NA
Increasing
Decreasing
Increasing
Decreasing
Increasing
Significant Account
Gross Revenue
NA
Total Net Income
NA
Accounts Payable
NA
NA
Other Income
NA
Accrued Taxes
NA
Property, Plant, and
Equipment
Total Assets
Bills Payable
Bonded Debt
Common Stock
Preferred Stock
Direction of
Manipulation
Increasing
Increasing
Decreasing
Decreasing
Decreasing
Decreasing
Decreasing
Decreasing
Decreasing
Increasing
IncreasinE!
Section B of Table 5 summarizes the results for the regu-
lated companies. On the income statement, it was expected that
only nonoperating items would be manipulated as the regulators
scrutinized operating revenues and expenses. This expectation
was confirmed by the results. Nonoperating revenues were
manipulated downward to show lower profits. However, accrued
taxes were actually manipulated in a downward direction which
increases income. The manipulation of nonoperating revenues
is logically related to rate setting in the regulated environment.
However, the manipulation of taxes may have been more mo-
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tivated by manipulations to attract investors. These regulated
companies do not want to increase income much to reduce rates
and increase regulation by being too profitable, but showing
lower payments for taxes may be a way to indicate to investors
that the company is trying to control costs.
Since rates were ofren influenced by accounting-rates-of-
return, rate-regulated companies would have an incentive to
increase net assets to convince regulators that higher rates are
needed. The results were consistent with this expectation with
respect to liability and equity manipulations. However, property,
plant, and equipment showed a decrease rather than the expect-
ed increase. This result may not be completely inconsistent if
regulators did examine the operating-asset base as part of their
evaluations. The reduction of property, plant, and equipment
would make the company look more efficient with its use of as-
sets and place the company in higher regard with the regulators.
While neither the depreciation or operating-expenses accounts
showed signs of manipulation, if the companies were expensing
assets rather than capitalizing them or recording higher levels
of depreciation, deliberate decreases in operating assets would
be associated with lower income which is consistent with the
rate-increasing goal. The significant decrease in property, plant,
and equipment, then, could have been accomplished with some
manipulations to both depreciation and operating expenses so
that the statistically significant effect in property, plant, and
equipment was spread between two other accounts, making the
manipulations to the expense accounts more difficult for Ben-
ford's Law to detect.
The manipulations observed with debt and equity accounts
are highly consistent with achieving the rate-increasing goal.
The asset base must be financed through either debt or eq-
uity. By showing lower debt balances, the company indicates to
regulators a higher reliance on equity financing. This not only
appears safer but also decreases the retum-on-equity measure
which would lead regulators to a conclusion that higher rates
are needed for this well run, safe utility or railroad. Thus, these
manipulations together are highly encouraged by the way regu-
lators set rates.
The results taken as a whole for the rate-regulated compa-
nies indicate that these companies responded to the regulatory
environment extremely well. No manipulations were found in
the operating-income accounts which regulators scrutinized.
The manipulations found, however, are highly consistent with
actions that could maximize rates given the system used to set
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rates. Thus, as with manipulations found in current reporting,
rate-regulated companies were examining incentives set up by
regulators and manipulated accounts to get the highest return
for shareholders.
Because of less oversight, the original expectation was that
more accounts would be manipulated by unregulated entities.
This ended up not being the case. The regulated companies
were documented to manipulate eight different line items on
financial statements while unregulated, companies were shown
to manipulate only three line items. The increased manipulation
by regulated companies actually may have been encouraged by
the regulation. The regulated companies were aware of what
the regulators looked at and how the regulators determined the
need for rate increases. This knowledge provided companies
with the information needed to work within the regulations to
try to increase rates. The unregulated companies lacked regula-
tory scrutiny and were, therefore, able to manipulate any ac-
counts they wanted to achieve goals of higher income and net
assets. As a result, the unregulated companies may have manip-
ulated different accounts to achieve the higher income/net assets
appealing to shareholders. Benford's Law looks at a whole set of
numbers to find manipulation rather than just the number for
one company. Therefore, if a few unregulated companies were
manipulating each account, the technique used in this paper to
detect the manipulations would not find any distortions in the
reported data. The accounts found to have significant manipula-
tion were accounts that are high profile in conducting analysis;
revenues and net income are highly referenced numbers in anal-
ysis. Thus, the significant manipulation was to accounts that
investors would likely use to assess the company directly rather
than to accounts that would accomplish the higher income goal
less directly. The regulated companies could not manipulate
these high-profile accounts because they were being scrutinized
by regulators. Therefore, to accomplish the same goals, the
regulated companies had to manipulate lower-profue accounts,
which, because of lower dollar value, may have necessitated
multiple manipulations. These issues taken together explain the
relative frequency of accounts being manipulated between the
regulated and unregulated samples.
The conclusion that regulated companies did not manipu-
late operating revenues and expenses is also important. These
were the accounts scrutinized by regulators. By failing to find
manipulation in these accounts for regulated companies but
finding manipulation of gross revenues and net income by un-
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regulated companies during the same time period, this study
demonstrates that regulatory scrutiny did seem to influence
behavior of company officials.
Another limitation of using Benford's Law to investigate the
existence of financial-statement manipulations is that it provides
no evidence of how the manipulations occur. The amount of the
likely manipulation is not determined by a Benford's Law analy-
sis. Analysis using other techniques would be needed to answer
these questions.
The analysis in this study did show results that are con-
sistent with the assertion that regulated and unregulated com-
panies managed reported results and did so in different ways.
The only common area of manipulation was current liabilities.
While unregulated companies manipulated revenue and income,
regulated companies were more likely to manipulate amounts
in non-value maximizing ways and did so in accounts that were
more difficult to verify. This suggests that the regulatory process
provided some scrutiny of results and did influence the types of
manipulations made. Examining the pre-SEC, pre-audit, pre-
promulgated accounting standards era indicates that incentives
did exist for manipulation and that financial-statement manipu-
lation did exist consistent with those incentives. Therefore, the
results indicate that to reduce financial-statement manipulation
in the past as well as today, either incentives for manipulation
need to be reduced and/or greater oversight with respect to what
is reported is needed. This confirms the importance of examin-
ing the incentives implicit in both private contracts and public
regulations.
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